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 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International*
Trade, sitting by designation.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 





                             Appellant
v.
DAVID DIGUGLIELMO, Superintendent SCI Graterford; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DAUPHIN
COUNTY
______
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Civil No. 4:07-cv-01505)
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III
______
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 16, 2011
______
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, 
and RESTANI,  Judge*
(Filed: December 13, 2011)
______
OPINION OF THE COURT
______
2RESTANI, Judge.
Petitioner Charles Diggs appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, filed on the basis that defense counsel failed to disclose material evidence.  For
the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts and procedural
history.  Petitioner was arrested for and charged with the kidnaping and first degree
murder of Nancy White.  Jack Singer was the prosecution’s key witness, connecting
Diggs to the crime.  While incarcerated as a parole violator, Jack Singer wrote four letters
to the police and district attorney in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania offering information
concerning Diggs’s case.  In those letters, Singer asked the district attorney to arrange for
him to return to parole status and to help him avoid prison, but stated that his testimony
and help were not contingent upon these requests.  At the time of his trial testimony,
Singer was not incarcerated, no charges were pending against him, and no deal for his
testimony was in place.  In April 1977, petitioner was convicted.
After petitioner exhausted his right of direct appeal, he filed a habeas corpus
petition and a state court petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), which were denied.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541–46.  In November
2000, petitioner filed a second PCRA petition, claiming, inter alia, that evidence
impeaching Singer had been withheld and the failure to disclose this evidence constituted
a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  The PCRA court found no
3Brady violation and denied relief.  Diggs exhausted his state court appeals.  In August
2007, petitioner filed his second habeas corpus petition, which the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania denied.  Petitioner now appeals.
This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253.
[W]here a habeas petitioner’s claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state
court, the petition may not be granted unless the state court decision “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.”
Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).  Our
review of the District Court’s legal conclusions is plenary.  See Coombs v. Diguglielmo,
616 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
A Brady violation occurs when evidence, 1) is favorable to the accused, 2) was
suppressed by the prosecution, and 3) is prejudicial or material to petitioner’s guilt.  See
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
112–13 (1976).  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to
uphold Pennsylvania Superior Court’s affirmance of the PCRA court’s decision.  The
Superior Court agreed with the PCRA court that the prosecutor did not suppress the
letters Singer wrote while incarcerated because no evidence of a deal existed and the
State had filed an “Application Concerning Material Witness” regarding Singer seven
months before petitioner’s trial.  The Application stated that Singer had been incarcerated
but was released and that the charges against him had been dropped.  It also stated that
4Singer was previously motivated to testify out of a fear that he might be imprisoned again
and he felt endangered in prison.  Even though this Application was docketed but not
personally served on petitioner’s counsel, the Application was served on the Public
Defender’s Office and was a matter of public record.  Therefore, petitioner was on notice
that documentary evidence regarding Singer’s testimony might exist.  Accordingly, the
District Court did not err in agreeing with the state court that the letters were not
suppressed.
Second, even if the letters were suppressed, they were not material.  Evidence is
material “‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”  Strickler, 527 U.S. at
280 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677–81 (1985) (noting a stricter
standard for materiality where defendant fails to make a specific request for the evidence
in question)).  Here, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
and Superior Court’s conclusion that the letters did not create a reasonable doubt as to
petitioner’s guilt, and therefore the four letters were not material.  The District Court did
not err because, at the time of the trial, Singer was not facing criminal charges or
incarcerated, so his testimony was not motivated by fear or any agreement with the State. 
Moreover, Singer initially offered to testify at the trial even if the charges against him
were not dropped.  Thus, the letters were not material.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
